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“Dollars Versus [Equality] Rights”:1
Money and the Limits on
Distributive Justice
Hester A. Lessard*
I. INTRODUCTION
Questions about the constraints “money” places on justice, what
Binnie J. in his reasons for the Court in Newfoundland (Treasury Board)
v. Newfoundland and Labrador Assn. of Public and Private Employees
called the “dollars versus rights controversy”,2 arise frequently in the
adjudication of rights claims under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.3 They are particularly salient in the social benefit challenges
under section 15, the Charter’s equality guarantee, in which equality is
invoked to argue that a governmental benefit or program exacerbates
inequality by not going far enough in its coverage or because of discriminatory under-inclusiveness. Government parties often respond to
such challenges by asserting that cost factors — the strain on government
budgets, the need to channel financial resources in other directions —
explain and justify the alleged inequality. The tension between scarcity
and justice that structures this exchange between rights holders and
governments lies at the heart of conceptions of distributive justice.
*

University of Victoria. I wish to thank the organizers, Professors Jamie Cameron, Sonia
Lawrence, Ben Berger and James Stribopoulos, of the 15th Annual Constitutional Cases Conference,
May 4, 2012, at which this paper was presented. I wish also to thank Kate Feeney and Ashley Caron,
my able research assistants at the University of Victoria. Special thanks are owed to Professor Sonia
Lawrence for organizing the “Money and Justice (Limits on Rights)” panel and for encouraging me
to follow through with the completion of this paper, and to Professors Lawrence and Cameron for
their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. Finally, I am indebted to my colleague Gillian Calder
who provided, at very short notice, helpful substantive comments as well as numerous editorial
suggestions on the penultimate draft. All errors, oversights and misperceptions are my own.
1
Justice Binnie, for the Court, in Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. Newfoundland and
Labrador Assn. of Public and Private Employees, [2004] S.C.J. No. 61, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 381, at
para. 65 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “NAPE”].
2
Id.
3
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
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The mechanisms for state redistributive efforts range from taxation
provisions, to labour market adjustments, to direct distribution of
financial benefits such as income assistance, and to the distribution of
goods in kind such as medical care or child care. The latter two vehicles
— social welfare programs — are associated in Canada and other
western democracies with the brief heyday, in the first two or three
decades following the Second World War, of the liberal welfare state.
Reinforced by the political optimism and economic prosperity of that era,
liberal polities such as Canada displayed a relatively strong commitment
to distributive justice and, in varying degrees, to public responsibility in
that regard.4 The programs for social support developed during this era,
albeit typically amended and often reduced in generosity and scope, are
the focus of the social benefit cases. Taken together, the cases raise the
question of whether an equality litigant, no matter how convincing his or
her claim of inequality, can win if the cost to governments is too high.
This volume celebrates the Charter’s 30th anniversary. Our Charter
has come of age in a neo-liberal era, one in which whatever political
consensus there once was regarding distributive justice has splintered
and dissolved. It is also an era in which courts do not hesitate to ask
where and when “dollars” should trump rights, and where and when the
market, rather than the state, should be left to distribute the basic resources on which individual security depends. Indeed, in Chaoulli v.
Québec (Attorney General), a number of judges embrace the notion that
the market is the ultimate source of security for individual Canadians and
that government efforts at redistribution, such as the national medical
care program, should not impede access to the market by economically
advantaged individuals seeking a faster, more efficient satisfaction of
their basic medical needs.5 Under this model, the private (individual) not
4

It is important not to overstate the progressive character of welfare state regimes and
politics during this historical period. Much scholarship has pointed out the racist and (hetero)sexist
character of the programs put in place during this era, as well as their middle-class bias. See
discussion of this literature in Hester Lessard, “Substantive Universality: Reconceptualizing
Feminist Approaches to Social Provision and Child Care”, in Shelley A.M. Gavigan & Dorothy E.
Chunn, The Legal Tender of Gender: Law, Welfare and the Regulation of Women’s Poverty (Oxford
and Portland, OR: Hart, 2010) 217, at 222-23 and in Hester Lessard, “The Empire of the Lone
Mother: Parental Rights, Child Welfare Law, and State Restructuring” (2002) 39(4) Osgoode Hall
L.J. 717 [hereinafter “Empire of the Lone Mother”]. Nevertheless, a key marker of the shift in
political values from welfare liberalism to neo-liberalism is the diminished notion of collective state
responsibility for individual human need. Id.
5
[2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chaoulli”]. See in particular the judgment by McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J., with whom Bastarache J. agreed. See also
the reasons by Deschamps J. which, although based on the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms,
R.S.Q. c. C-12, express a similar view.
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the public (state) has a primary and relatively enlarged responsibility for
well-being.
In this paper, I review the Supreme Court of Canada’s equality decisions, from 1985 to the present, that fall roughly within the category of
social benefit challenges, namely, challenges to public programs or
initiatives that distribute goods in kind or in cash.6 The rights claims in
these cases — a cohort of 13 — directly require governments to expend
money, leading courts and commentators to refer to the “positive” nature
of equality rights. It has long been argued by advocates of such interpretations and of the entrenchment of socio-economic rights, that many
procedural rights, as well as rights that are generally characterized as
“negative”, also may entail large government expenditures.7 The point
made is that the reluctance of courts to recognize claims that have a
“positive” component simply because, as such, they entail government
expenditures, is not warranted. I agree with that argument. However, one
of my purposes in this paper is to explore how judges at our highest court
engage with the budgetary impacts on governments of rights recognition.
Thus, it makes methodological sense to focus on the social benefit cases,
given that they are more clearly perceived by judges to be about redistribution and about a public responsibility for social provision that is
6

To identify this cohort of cases, I started with the list of all S.C.C. equality cases compiled for the study by Bruce Ryder et al., “What’s Law Good For? An Empirical Overview of
Charter Equality Decisions” in P. Monahan & J. Cameron, eds. (2004) 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) 103, at
Appendix A [hereinafter “Ryder et al.”]. I updated it to the present and then winnowed out the
benefits cases. I included NAPE even though it is not a social benefit case because it concerns a
direct financial award to rectify a (pay equity) inequality. It is also, of course, a key case in the
“dollars versus rights” jurisprudence. I hemmed and hawed over whether or not to include Health
Services and Support – Facilities Sector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27,
[2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Health Services”], which is also not a social benefit case
in the narrow sense used here. It concerned the distribution of and respect for collective bargaining
rights. The financial implications for government budgets lay at the heart of the case and of many of
the arguments made by the B.C. government. However, in the end I excluded it because it did not fit
the social benefit template, although I do reference it in the discussion of doctrinal approaches to
factoring “public purse” impacts into s. 1 analysis. See discussion infra, at note 109.
7
See, for example, R. v. Askov, [1990] S.C.J. No. 106, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199 (S.C.C.)
addressing the right of the accused to be tried within a reasonable time. See also the discussion of
Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] S.C.J. No. 11, [1985] 1 S.C.R.
177 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Singh”], infra, at notes 85-89. Finally, see also the discussion of Askov
and other similar procedural fairness cases in Patrick Macklem & Craig Scott, “Constitutional Ropes
of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights in a New South African Constitution” (1992)
141(1) U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, at 48 to 53. Macklem and Scott argue that courts in liberal societies have
routinely interpreted so-called “negative” civil and political rights in a manner that imposes positive
obligations on governments to take steps that often involve the significant expenditure of financial
resources. The social benefit cases do not require that deconstructive analysis, as they are more
commonly perceived as entailing positive financial obligations on governments.
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financially burdensome. Finally, it is useful to distinguish my selected
cohort from the companion cohort of “private” benefit cases, namely,
equality cases in which similar arguments about discriminatory underinclusion and inequality are made in relation to access to private, rather
than public, sources of support, such as spousal support under family law
regimes or coverage under accident insurance regimes. This latter cohort
raises its own set of questions about distributive justice and neo-liberal
politics, in particular about the relative willingness of judicial actors to
articulate robust commitments to redistribution when the burden is viewed
as a private individual rather than public collective responsibility.8
In both cohorts — the social or public benefit cases and the private
benefit cases — the theoretical question about where responsibility for
individual social security resides, to which the Chaoulli plurality gave a
neo-liberal answer, is not always explicitly discussed. However, it hovers
in the background, shaping the “common sense” that underpins judicial
line-drawing and parsing of alternatives. As already noted, many of the
regimes challenged in the social benefit cases developed in the very
different political climate of the post-war era. Given that Charter jurisprudence commenced in earnest in the mid and late 1980s, the cases
explored in this paper, as in Chaoulli, sometimes represent a complex
encounter between two political rationalities, one welfare liberal and the
other neo-liberal.9
There are two principled justifications typically offered in the case
law for judicial reluctance to find in favour of rights claims where doing
so would entail significant expenditures by governments. The first is the
institutional limitations concern, namely, that courts lack the institutional
competence to make complex budgetary decisions. The second is the
legitimacy or separation of powers concern, namely, that decisions with a
significant budgetary impact lie outside the appropriate constitutional
role of the judicial branch in relation to the legislative branch. The
competence concern has been thoughtfully and critically analyzed, with a
particular focus on its deployment in anti-poverty litigation, by David
Wiseman.10 Legitimacy concerns have been a key theme in the work of
8

See discussion in “Empire of the Lone Mother”, supra, note 4, at 745-46.
Colleen Sheppard, Inclusive Equality: The Relational Dimensions of Systemic Discrimination in Canada (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010), at 51-57,
analyzing how conceptions of government that more generally inform the political discourse in a
given historical period can shape judicial interpretations of rights and limits on rights under the
Charter.
10
David Wiseman, “Competence Concerns in Charter Adjudication: Countering the AntiPoverty Incompetence Argument” (2006) 51 McGill L.J. 503 [hereinafter “Competence Concerns”];
9
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Andrew Petter.11 This paper does not delve into those institutional and
normative considerations, but rather pursues two more modest objectives.
The first objective is to examine the relation between the public cost
of rights recognition in each of the cases in my selected cohort and the
pattern of wins and losses. In other words, this objective is about noting
the purported price of rights recognition in each Supreme Court of
Canada section 15 social benefits case, and then charting the correlation
with success or defeat of the rights claim. I did my best to find the dollar
figure that the Court itself or the government parties used as an estimate
of budgetary impact. Most of the time, where that impact has been a key
element in the arguments put forward by government parties, I have not
needed to look beyond the judgments themselves. In some of the cases, I
have referred to the decisions below to find a figure. In others, I have
resorted to print media accounts of government claims about budgetary
impacts. In one case, I was fortunate to have counsel for one of the
parties help me establish a rough estimate. In a few, I found it impossible
to find anything very concrete.12
Given that my ultimate goal is to arrive at a more precise mapping of
how the Supreme Court of Canada takes account of the limits “money”
places on justice, it makes sense to use the dollar figure that is actually in
play in the litigation rather than to attempt to establish the “real” or
actual cost. However, it soon became evident that the manner of calculating budgetary impacts varied quite significantly from case to case. In
some, the “past injustice” amount, namely, the cost of repairing the
injustice done to the claimants, is the benchmark. In others, it is the
future burden on governments if they are obliged to extend a benefit to
an expanded, more inclusive class of beneficiaries. Sometimes, it is a
combination of both. By itself, this variation raises questions that need
to be more clearly addressed. I return to this and similar points in the
conclusion of this paper.
My second objective is to outline the doctrinal tools offered by the
case law for factoring the public cost of rights recognition into Charter
analysis. For this second task, I looked at the same range of cases plus a
few additional ones in which key propositions about “dollars versus
and “Taking Competence Seriously” in Margot Young et al., eds., Poverty: Rights, Social
Citizenship and Legal Activism (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007), at 263-80.
11
Andrew Petter, The Politics of the Charter: The Illusive Promise of Constitutional Rights
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010).
12
A future research agenda may allow for more thorough research into court records and
facta. However, that was not possible within the time frame for this paper.
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rights” have been articulated. Key to this discussion regarding doctrinal
approaches is the overall framework for Charter analysis. As the jurisprudence has developed, assumptions and questions have recurred about
which of the three main steps in a typical Charter analysis — the rights
analysis, the section 1 limitation, or the remedy stage, or all three — is
the appropriate point at which to factor in the budgetary impact of rights
recognition.
I have divided this paper into two parts to explore these two objectives. I then conclude with some reflections on the gaps and inconsistencies in the case law. In my view, it is unrealistic to expect courts to
seriously engage with questions of distributive justice under the Charter
unless there is a better, more transparent approach to assessing budgetary
impacts and to factoring them into the overall framework for adjudicating rights.

II. WHAT HAS THE SUPREME COURT DONE? THE COST OF RIGHTS
RECOGNITION AND THE PATTERN OF WINS AND LOSSES
If you look at the cases simply in terms of budgetary impacts, i.e.,
the cost of rights recognition, a pattern emerges. The pattern is quite
stark. All the cases that are successful are ones in which rights recognition is costless, is of comparatively low cost, or is characterized by the
Court as an inexpensive or even money-saving outcome. All the cases in
which rights recognition is “expensive” fail. Some “inexpensive” claims
also fail, but that does not alter the “follow the money” pattern.13 I will
examine in chronological order the five successful cases first, followed
by the eight unsuccessful cases.
1. Cases in which the Claim Was Successful
The successful cases are Tétreault-Gadoury v. Canada (Employment
and Immigration Commission),14 Schachter v. Canada,15 Eldridge v.
British Columbia (Attorney General),16 Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v.
13

The same conclusion is reached by David Wiseman in “Competence Concerns”, supra,
note 10, at 528, in a study that looks at a slightly different collection of cases.
14
[1991] S.C.J. No. 41, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 22 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Tétreault-Gadoury”].
15
[1992] S.C.J. No. 68, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Schachter”].
16
[1997] S.C.J. No. 86, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Eldridge”].
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Laseur17 and Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop.18 Tétreault-Gadoury
is the first “dollars versus rights” equality case. Marcelle TétreaultGadoury challenged the exclusion of persons over the age of 65 from
eligibility for full benefits under the Unemployment Insurance Act
1971.19 She was successful at the Federal Court of Appeal, whereupon
the federal government repealed the exclusionary provision retroactive to
the date of the decision, namely, September 23, 1988. However, Ms.
Tétreault-Gadoury turned 65 before that date, but after the equality
provisions came into force on April 17, 1985. Consequently, she represented a significant but numerically fixed group of persons whose claims
remained unsatisfied, and pursued her claim to the Supreme Court of
Canada. A unanimous Court, in reasons written by La Forest J. for
himself and Lamer C.J.C., found in her favour. Justice La Forest adopted
Lacombe J.’s observation at the Federal Court of Appeal that the federal
scheme “permanently deprives the applicant, and any other person of her
age, of the status of a socially insured person by making her a pensioner
of the state, even if she is still looking for a new job ... [She] must at that
point become the complete responsibility of the special social assistance
programs of the government...”.20 Justice La Forest, at the minimal
impairment stage of the section 1 analysis, also commented that Lacombe J. “properly” noted that the government did not provide any
evidence that it could not afford to extend benefits to those over 65.21 In
short, although the case does not yield a specific dollar figure for the cost
of rights recognition, it seems fair to assume that it was not an amount
that the federal government thought would sway the Court. Moreover,
recognizing rights in Tétreault-Gadoury did not involve an ongoing
liability for the government, and, in fact, is portrayed as a way to avoid
such a liability by assisting claimants in reintegrating into the labour
market rather than steering them toward government-funded pension
benefits.22 As such, Tétreault-Gadoury, the first in this line of cases, is
completely in step with the neo-liberal political winds that, by 1991,
were beginning to gather force across the political spectrum. In the
17

[2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Martin”].
[2007] S.C.J. No. 10, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hislop”].
19
S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48, s. 31(1). Persons over 65 were provided a lump sum payment in
lieu of full benefits, if they met other criteria. The lump sum was equal to three weeks of benefits.
See s. 31(2).
20
Tétreault-Gadoury, supra, note 14, at 40-41, per La Forest J. for the Court, quoting Lacombe J., [1989] F.C.J. No. 818, [1989] 2 F.C. 245, at 268 (F.C.A.).
21
Tétreault-Gadoury, id., at 46.
22
Id.
18
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Tétreault-Gadoury judgment, the unemployment insurance regime is
aligned on the side of private, market-based solutions — namely, paid
employment — to well-being, while regimes aimed at support for the
elderly are aligned on the side of public, state-funded welfare responses
to individual social security needs.
Schachter is the second in our line of successful cases as well as a
foundational case on remedies. It established that, under section 52(1) of
the Constitution Act 1982, courts have considerable remedial flexibility.
As the majority stated, “[d]epending upon the circumstances, a court may
simply strike down, it may strike down and temporarily suspend the
declaration of invalidity, or it may resort to the techniques of reading
down or reading in.”23 At stake was the entitlement of new biological
parents to the same parental benefits accorded new adoptive parents
under the federal employment insurance scheme. The scheme provided
for maternity benefits for biological mothers and parental benefits for
adoptive fathers and mothers.24 Hence, biological fathers like the
claimant, Shalom Schachter, were ineligible for any benefits, and the
case was frequently referred to as a “fathers’ benefit” case. Shalom
Schachter’s equality challenge was successful at the Federal Court Trial
Division and at the Federal Court of Appeal. Leave was then granted to
the Supreme Court of Canada.
The main focus of argument at the Court was on the issue of what
sort of remedy to grant in the face of the federal government’s concession
that the exclusion of biological fathers from any kind of parental benefit
violated equality rights and could not be justified under section 1.25 The
Court considered as well how the costs to government of various
remedial options should be factored into the analysis of appropriate
remedy. In advance of the trial decision, the press had reported that the
cost to the federal government of extending benefits to biological fathers
would be around $500 million per year.26 In the context of other cases in
my cohort that deal with impacts on the federal budget, this is a serious
impact and would certainly put this case in the group of “expensive

23

Schachter, supra, note 15, at 695, per Lamer C.J.C. for the majority.
Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, supra, note 19, s. 32.
25
Chief Justice Lamer, for the majority, was dissatisfied with the government’s concession
on the s. 15 issue and with their failure to attempt a s. 1 justification at trial. He noted that the Court
was thereby deprived of the opportunity to assess the merits of the s. 15 issue and of access to the
sort of evidence generated by s. 1. Schachter, supra, note 15, at 695.
26
Ken MacQueen, “Father’s paternity-leave court fight could cost govt. millions in benefits”, Ottawa Citizen [Final Edition] (August 19, 1987) A16.
24
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rights claims”.27 However, in between the Supreme Court’s granting of
leave and its hearing, the federal government resolved the “inequality”
problem and avoided much of the budgetary impact of rights recognition
by equalizing down, i.e., by making biological fathers eligible but at the
same time cutting back the entitlement for all parental benefits.28
The legislative revision of the regime in the middle of the Schachter
litigation offers two ways of thinking about the result in Schachter, both
of which are consistent with the larger “follow the money” pattern. By
the time the Supreme Court of Canada heard the case, a legislative
resolution had been found that rendered a finding in favour of the
equality claimant “costless”, in rough terms, from the perspective of the
public purse. Hence, this case is one in which rights recognition is not
simply “inexpensive” but in which the Court knows the budgetary
impacts are either effectively nil or have already been absorbed. However, the majority reasons by Lamer C.J.C. nevertheless explored the
factors that should be weighed in remedying under-inclusive legislation
in Schachter type circumstances. Chief Justice Lamer found that the
appropriate remedy would have been to declare invalid the provision
providing parental benefits for new adoptive fathers and mothers and, at
the same time, to suspend the declaration in order to give Parliament
time to consider the option of preserving the benefit while correcting the
inequality problem. In other words, the majority would have decided to
get rid of the benefit altogether rather than add the excluded group by
“reading in”.29 The suspension held out the hope, but not the promise, of
some sort of reconfigured benefit. A key circumstance for the majority
was the fact that the size of the excluded group, biological fathers, was
much larger than the size of the included group, adoptive parents, and
that, therefore, the “financial shake up” for the federal budget that would

27
See the table at the end of this Part for a summary of the costs of rights recognition in
relation to federal and provincial budgets in my cohort of cases. What counts as “serious” is of
course a key question in my study. I have generally taken the Court’s word for it. If the judgments
are treating an impact as serious, I am more interested in simply noting what amount is being treated
as serious rather than challenging that assessment. However, in the conclusion, I do comment on
some of the inconsistencies in how the Court measures the seriousness of a budgetary impact. See
discussion infra, between notes 129 and 130.
28
The amendments made parental benefits available for all new parents, biological and
adoptive, but reduced the entitlement from 15 to 10 weeks of benefits: Act to amend the Unemployment Insurance Act and the Employment and Immigration Department and Commission Act, S.C.
1990, c. 40.
29
The concurring reasons by La Forest J., writing for himself and L’Heureux-Dubé J., were
in general agreement with Lamer C.J.C.’s approach.
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be caused by the Court “reading in” would be considerable.30 In short,
Schachter, at least theoretically, is a case in which a rights recognition
claim that had a serious budgetary impact was successful; however, the
remedy that would have been granted would have actually “saved”
Parliament money because it solved the equality problem by getting rid
of the benefit altogether — a rather hollow victory from a distributive
justice perspective. Indeed, on this analysis, it might make more sense to
treat Schachter as a case in which an expensive claim was lost, and in
which both the included and excluded group were left at risk of having
no benefit at all. Because of the intervening action by Parliament in the
form of equalizing down, the actual outcome was to maintain, roughly
speaking, the budgetary status quo.
The larger public/private dimension of Schachter is equally complex.
In contrast to the unemployment benefits in Tétreault-Gadoury, statefunded parental benefits are aligned with public responsibility for social
reproduction in contradistinction to private, familial responsibility.
However, the location of the benefit program in an employment insurance regime ties the benefit, as in Tétreault-Gadoury, to a vision that
gives primacy to market-based responses to social security that, in turn,
ultimately place responsibility on the shoulders of individuals. In short,
being a parent is not enough; you have to have engaged in the requisite
amount of paid employment in order to qualify for the benefit. The crosscutting factor of gender further complicates the public/private dynamic,
as social patterns of engagement in the unpaid work of social reproduction were and are deeply gendered. To the extent that public supports fall
short of fully addressing the work of social reproduction, that work tends
to be taken up by women. Parliament’s gender-neutral “equalize down”
solution is viewed in the feminist commentary as an approach that, in the
end, undermined the amount of support for primary caregivers, the bulk
of whom are women.31 Also, the majority’s implicit preference for a
“strike and suspend” remedy in the context of under-inclusive legislation
has been criticized for “increas[ing] the vulnerability of groups which
currently receive social benefits”.32

30

Schachter, supra, note 15, at 723.
Nitya Iyer, “Some Mothers are Better than Others: A Re-examination of Maternity Benefits” in Susan B. Boyd, ed., Challenging the Public/Private Divide: Feminism, Law, and Public
Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) 168, at 182-84.
32
Nitya Duclos (now Iyer), “A Remedy for the Nineties” (1992) 4 Const. Forum Const. 22,
at 23.
31
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Next comes Eldridge, a case in the mid-1990s in which hearingimpaired patients at Vancouver General Hospital successfully challenged
the failure of the hospital to provide them with sign-language translators
for their interactions with medical personnel. The cost of doing so was
estimated at $150,000 per year.33 After finding that section 15 had been
violated, La Forest J., writing for a unanimous Court, turned to the
section 1 stage of analysis. Here he assumed without deciding that the
objective of “controlling health expenditures” qualified as a substantial
and pressing objective to which the decision regarding sign-language
translation costs of the hospital’s committee was rationally connected.34
However, he found that the decision was not minimally impairing. The
insignificance of the cost to government played a crucial role in La
Forest J.’s analysis. He characterized the amount as “approximately
0.0025 percent of the provincial health care budget” and “a relatively
insignificant sum”.35 The refusal to spend such an amount, he concluded,
“cannot possibly constitute a minimal impairment of the appellants’
constitutional rights”.36
The next case, Martin, occurred in the early 2000s. It concerned a
successful equality challenge to provisions in the Nova Scotia workers’
compensation regime that excluded chronic pain claims from coverage
under the regular part of the regime and, instead, provided much more
limited compensation for successful claimants.37 The question of budgetary impacts came up, as in Eldridge, at the section 1 stage. Justice
Gonthier, writing for a unanimous Court, dealt with them in relation to
the “substantial and compelling objective” prong of analysis. He tiptoed
around the question of whether “controlling expenditures” could in fact
serve as a substantial and compelling objective, instead dismissing the
government’s argument in this regard for lack of evidence. He observed:
Nothing in the evidence establishes that the chronic pain claims in and
of themselves placed sufficient strain upon the Accident Fund to
threaten its viability, or that such claims significantly contributed to its
present unfunded liability.38

33

Eldridge, supra, note 16, at para. 4.
Id., at para. 84.
Id., at para. 87.
36
Id.
37
Workers’ Compensation Act, S.N.S. 1994-95, c. 10, s. 10B – Functional Restoration
(Multi-Faceted Pain Services) Program Regulations, N.S. Reg. 57/96.
38
Martin, supra, note 17, at para. 109.
34
35
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This suggests that, as in Tétreault-Gadoury, the economic impact on
government of including chronic pain sufferers in full coverage was not
significant enough to be explicitly advanced as a factor justifying underinclusion.39
Hislop, in 2007, is the last in the line of successful claims. It was a
class action that challenged the limits placed on the retroactivity of
survivor benefits for same-sex spouses under the Canada Pension Plan.40
The provisions in question had been enacted to rectify the exclusion of
same-sex spouses from the scheme, in the wake of the Court’s 1999
decision in M. v. H.41 The latter case is a key private benefit case in
which a same-sex challenge to exclusion from access to the spousal
support provisions in family law legislation was found to violate equality
in a manner that could not be justified under section 1.42 In Hislop, as in
Tétreault-Gadoury, the retroactive reach of the amendments with respect
to eligibility for benefits (triggered by the death of the contributor
spouse) stopped significantly short of April 17, 1985, the date when
section 15 became effective.43 Moreover, the statute contained a provision that limited all claimants to 12 months of retroactive compensation
calculated from the date at which an application for benefits was made.44
However, the remedial amendments denied same-sex survivors the
benefit of the 12 months of arrears if they applied after July 2000.45 More
fundamentally, the amendments failed to recognize the unfairness of the
“only 12 months of arrears” rule in relation to the members of the Hislop
class who had no opportunity to apply for benefits in a timely manner
because of their unconstitutional exclusion from the regime during the
years before the M. v. H. decision.46 The majority at the Supreme Court
39
Id., at para. 109. Justice Gonthier went on to consider government arguments based on
three other objectives: developing a consistent legislative response, avoiding fraudulent claims, and
implementing early medical intervention and return to work as the treatment for chronic pain. All
were dismissed. The first failed the substantial and compelling objective test and the other two the
minimal impairment test. Id., at paras. 110 to 117.
40
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-8 [hereinafter “CPP”].
41
M. v. H., [1999] S.C.J. No. 23, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
42
Id. A majority, in reasons by Cory and Iacobucci JJ., found that the exclusion of samesex spouses from the family law regime was a violation of equality rights that could not be justified
under s. 1. Justice Major and Bastarache J. each wrote separate reasons concurring in the result.
Justice Gonthier dissented.
43
Eligibility for survivor benefits was limited to those whose spouse died on or after January 1, 1998. See s. 44(1.1) [ad. 2000, c. 12, s. 44(3)] of the CPP.
44
CPP, s. 72(1).
45
Id., s. 72(2) [ad. 2000, c. 12, s. 54].
46
In addition, section 60(2) of the CPP limited the right of estates of survivors to apply for
benefits to a 12-month time period after the survivor’s death. The Hislop class argued that the Court
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of Canada found that eligibility for benefits should be extended to any
same-sex survivor whose spouse died after April 17, 1985, and that all
same-sex survivors should be provided with the benefit of 12 months of
arrears, but that there was no adverse impact on equality rights stemming
from the 12-month restriction.
The Hislop majority was willing to take account of budgetary impacts in the course of the section 1 proportionality analysis,47 but noted
that the federal government had not provided sufficient evidence of those
impacts.48 Indeed, the Crown conceded at trial that a successful claim by
the litigants would “not have a significant impact on the solvency of the
CPP”.49 Thus, the federal government’s section 1 arguments failed with
respect to the retroactive reach of the provisions regarding eligibility and
entitlement to 12 months of arrears. The challenge to the application of
the general restriction on arrears to the Hislop class was treated by the
majority as an argument about remedy. As such, the majority found that
the financial nature of the remedy was a legitimate factor to consider,
among others, given the overarching principle of the separate constitutional roles of courts and legislatures with respect to “the allocation of
public resources”.50 Accordingly, the majority denied the arrears part of
the claim on the “separation of powers” basis, namely, that courts should
defer to legislative decisions to place general limits, in this manner, on
eligibility for financial benefits.
Because the financial impact argument was not pursued by the federal government, it is hard to calculate what the actual cost of rights
recognition was in Hislop. Print media reported an array of possible
impacts ranging from $22 million51 to $400 million.52 R. Douglas Elliott,

should suspend s. 60(2) to the extent necessary to allow estates of members of the Hislop class to
claim benefits as if they had been recognized as survivors at the date of the deceased contributor.
The Hislop majority rejected this aspect of the claim, finding that estates do not have Charter rights.
Hislop, supra, note 18, at para. 73. An exception was made for Mr. Hislop, however. Although Mr.
Hislop died in between the notice of appeal to the Court and the hearing, his estate was able to get
the full benefit of the Court’s decision because he had been alive when a judgment in the case was
first obtained. Indeed, the estate of any class member who died after the conclusion of argument at
trial in the Ontario Superior Court was entitled to benefit from the ultimate decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada. Id., at paras. 74-77.
47
Id., at para. 64.
48
Id., at para. 65.
49
Hislop v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] O.J. No. 5212, 234 D.L.R. (4th) 465, at
para. 116 (Ont. S.C.J.).
50
Hislop, supra, note 18, at para. 100.
51
Tracey Tyler, “Same-sex survivor benefits challenged: Effective date is 1998, not ’85.
Ottawa argues First anniversary of gay ruling” Toronto Star (June 11, 2004) A21.
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counsel for the class of Hislop claimants, has extrapolated from the
actuarial evidence on the cost of the claim, estimated at $50 million,
provided at trial by a Crown witness to arrive at a rough estimate of the
actual cost to federal coffers of the partial victory for the Hislop class.
After the reduction of the class by deaths and taking account of the fact
that the Court upheld the 12-month restriction on arrears, he calculates
that the federal government was obliged to pay out approximately $25 to
$30 million in benefits in the wake of the decision.53 In terms of justice
trumping “money”, this case is the high-water mark.
The cost of the successful claims can be summarized as follows:
Table 1
Case
Amount
Tétreault- no figure provided,
Gadoury less expensive than denial of
1991
claim
Schachter Actually, $0
1992
Theoretically, $500 million and
described as a “financial shake
up”. Avoided by choosing
remedy that eliminates benefit
altogether thereby reducing
budgetary liability.
Eldridge $150,000 per annum
1997
0.0025% of health care budget
Martin no figure provided,
2003
evidence of budgetary impact
unconvincing
Hislop
Entire claim $50 million
2007
Successful part of claim $25 to
$30 million
Crown conceded budgetary impact of $50 million insignificant

Government Regime
Federal
employment
insurance
Federal

employment
insurance

British
health care
Columbia
Nova Scotia workers’
compensation
Federal

pensions
(CPP)

52
Allan Woods, “Court extends same-sex benefits: Ont. ruling on CPP death benefits”
Edmonton Journal (December 20, 2003) A8.
53
Conversation with R. Douglas Elliott at “Constitutional Cases” workshop, May 2012, and
further email correspondence June 8, 2012, on file with author.
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When charted in this way, it is clear that equality litigants have been
successful in the social benefit cases only when the cost of rights
recognition is small or can be in some way minimized by the Court. I
should stress that the link between the cost of rights and the success or
failure of a claim is a correlation only. Typically, there are multiple
reasons why an equality claim succeeds so that the fact that the cost of
rights recognition is seen to be manageable is, at best, only one factor in
many. However, the overall pattern in wins and losses would seem to
indicate that it is a very important element.
2. Cases in which the Claim Was Unsuccessful
The unsuccessful cases in my selected cohort are: Egan v. Canada,54
Eaton v. Brant (County) Board of Education,55 Law v. Canada (Minister
of Employment and Immigration),56 Gosselin v. Québec (Attorney General),57 Hodge v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development),58
NAPE,59 Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney
General)60 and Withler v. Canada (Attorney General).61 In these eight
cases, there are some in which the costs to government of a victory
would have been staggering, and others in which the cost to government
would have been within the range of some of the successful claims
discussed above. In many of the cases, budgetary impacts play a prominent role in the decision; in a few, they appear to play no role at all.
We begin with three cases in the 1990s: Egan, Eaton and Law. Egan
concerned an equality challenge by same-sex spouses to the heterosexual
definition of spouse in the Old Age Security Act.62 Five judges found that
the exclusion violated section 15 and four of them went on to find that it
was an unjustifiable exclusion under section 1. The fifth, Sopinka J.,
disagreed with the section 1 analysis of this group primarily because of
the “novel” nature of the claim63 and the budgetary line-drawing and

54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

[1995] S.C.J. No. 43, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Egan”].
[1996] S.C.J. No. 98, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 241 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Eaton”].
[1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Law”].
[2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gosselin”].
[2004] S.C.J. No. 60, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 357 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hodge”].
Supra, note 1.
[2004] S.C.J. No. 41, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Auton”].
[2011] S.C.J. No. 12, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 396 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Withler”].
R.S.C. 1985, c. O-9 [hereinafter “OAS”].
Egan, supra, note 54, at para. 111.
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trade-offs involved in the design of social benefit regimes.64 His judgment, combined with that of four judges who refused to find an equality
violation, resulted in the denial of the claim. The cost of rights recognition to the federal government was estimated at between $12 million and
$37 million per annum, or between two and four per cent of the OAS
program’s costs.65 The amount was challenged at trial and an argument
made that the government figures were inflated.66 Two of the judges at
the Supreme Court characterized the evidence of budgetary impacts as
“highly speculative and statistically weak”.67 The calculation of budgetary impact in Egan is based not on the cost of remedying the harm to the
specific claimants but on attempts to predict what the government’s
annual liability going forward would be if same sex-spouses were
included in the regime.
The Eaton and Law judgments offer much less direct engagement
with the issue of budgetary impacts. Eaton focused on the decision by
provincial educational authorities to transfer Emily Eaton, a severely
disabled child, from her placement in an integrated regular classroom at
her neighbourhood elementary school to a special classroom at a school
outside her neighbourhood. Although there are no doubt different cost
implications for the provincial school system in relation to these two
kinds of placements, budgetary impacts do not feature in the judicial
analysis. I was unable to find an estimate in the decisions below or in the
media regarding the public cost of recognizing Eaton’s claim. The key
issue dividing judicial decision-makers was whether the transfer out of
an integrated and into a segregated setting on the grounds of Emily’s
“best interests” constituted a violation of section 15. Only Arbour J.A.,
writing for a unanimous Court of Appeal, thought so and would have
sent the case back for a rehearing, at which point expense considerations
might have become more prominent.68 A unanimous Supreme Court of
Canada overturned her decision, finding that there is no Charter-derived
presumption of integration into mainstream institutions in a situation
such as that of Emily Eaton, and that the decision to place her in a

64

Id., at paras. 108-110.
Id., at para. 99, per L’Heureux-Dubé J., dissenting.
Id.
67
Id., at para. 193, per Cory and Iacobucci JJ., dissenting on the s. 1 issue, in reasons written by Iacobucci J.
68
Eaton v. Brant (County) Board of Education, [1995] O.J. No. 315, 22 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont.
C.A.).
65
66
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segregated setting neither imposed “a burden or disadvantage” nor
constituted “the withholding of a benefit or advantage”.69
The next case is Law in 1999. Here the challenge was to an age cutoff in the CPP with respect to spousal survivor benefits.70 It was reported
in the media that court documents estimated it would cost $80 million by
2000 to extend benefits to all survivors.71 A unanimous judgment by the
Supreme Court of Canada found that there was no equality violation.
Again, as in Eaton, government concerns about budgetary impacts did
not feature in the Court’s analysis.
As we enter the 2000s, the list of failed challenges continues to grow.
Gosselin in 2002 concerns a claim that, of all the cases in my selected
cohort, carries the highest price tag for a provincial government. The
budgetary impact of the challenge to an age-based barrier to full social
assistance benefits under Quebec legislation was quantified at $389
million plus interest accrued since 1985.72 A majority at the Supreme
Court of Canada, in a deeply divided decision, rejected Gosselin’s claim
on both section 15 and section 7 grounds. Gosselin heralds a much more
explicit embrace of neo-liberal values. The contrast with TétreaultGadoury, roughly 10 years earlier, is instructive. In the latter case, the
Court finds that Marcelle Tétreault-Gadoury should not be steered, on the
basis of age, toward long-term dependency on an income assistance
program by the denial of access to a program aimed at facilitating reentry into the labour force. Here, conventional understandings of the
liberal values of choice and equality are preserved unchanged and
converge with the primacy given to market solutions by neo-liberalism.
Tétreault-Gadoury’s right to choose the path leading to reintegration into
the workforce is vindicated. In Gosselin, an age-based distinction
deployed to deny access to social assistance, in order to steer youth into
workfare programs, is applauded as facilitative rather than undermining
of human dignity. Conventional understandings of choice and equality
would seem to be at odds with the coercive aspects of the regime, which
makes use of the economic desperation of income assistance clients to
obtain the desired result. However, referring to the Quebec program,
McLachlin C.J.C. observed:
69
Eaton, supra, note 55, at paras. 79-81, per Sopinka J. for eight of nine judges. The ninth
judge, Lamer C.J.C., agreed in separate reasons.
70
CPP, ss. 44(1)(d) and 58.
71
Janice Tibbetts, “The Federal pension plan’s survivor benefit rules not discriminatory”
Ottawa Citizen [final edition] (March 26, 1999) A4.
72
Gosselin, supra, note 57, at para. 4, per McLachlin C.J.C. for the majority.
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The participation incentive worked towards the realization of the goals
that go to the heart of the equality guarantee: self-determination,
personal autonomy, self-respect, feelings of self-worth, and empowerment.
These are the stuff and substance of essential human dignity.73

In short, in Gosselin the liberal values of choice and equality are
not simply trumped or ignored, but rather rewritten so that they appear
to converge, as in Tétreault-Gadoury, with neo-liberal conceptions of
individual and social well-being. This remarkable normative shift in the
content of core liberal ideals occurs relatively invisibly under cover of
the flexible language of human dignity.74
Next come three cases decided in 2004: Hodge, NAPE and Auton. In
Hodge the budgetary impact of the issue is treated as insignificant; in
NAPE and Auton, budgetary impact is very much on the minds of the
judges. Hodge focused on eligibility for survivor benefits for common
law spouses under the CPP.75 The Supreme Court of Canada judgment
does not address financial impacts on government as a factor. However,
the Federal Court of Appeal decision did note that the federal government had not provided any clear evidence in that regard.76 This suggests
that the amount was not sufficiently large to support such an argument.77
A comparison with Hislop reinforces this inference, as both involve a
subset of common law spouses and the CPP. Hodge involves survivors
who had been separated from their spouses but continued to experience
the effects of financial interdependencies and Hislop involves survivors
who had been in intact same-sex spousal relationships.78
73

Id., at para. 65, per McLachlin C.J.C. for the majority.
Note that the doctrinal role of human dignity has since been much reduced, although the
normative shift in terms of what should count as an equality harm and what should count as equalityenhancing remains firmly embedded in the jurisprudence. See R. v. Kapp, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42,
[2008] 2 S.C.R. 483 at paras. 21 and 22 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kapp”], lamenting the doctrinal
missteps facilitated by the language of human dignity. See Margot Young, “Unequal to the Task;
‘Kapp’ing the Substantive Potential of Section 15” in S. Rodgers and S. McIntyre, eds. (2010) 50
S.C.L.R. (2d) 183 for an analysis of the way in which Kapp reinforces neo-liberal justice at the
expense of social justice.
75
CPP, s. 2(1) “spouse” [ad. c. 30 (2nd Supp., s. 1(3)] and s. 44(1)(d).
76
Hodge v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development), [2003] F.C.J. No. 900,
[2003] 1 F.C. 271, at para. 52 (F.C.A.), per Malone J.A., Evans and Linden JJ.A. concurring.
77
Exactly how large is sufficiently large is of course unclear. However, for my purpose of
determining how the Court perceives different amounts, comparison with other cases offers the best
guidance.
78
To clarify, while the group of survivors of all common law relationships is of course
much larger than the group of survivors of same-sex common law relationships, note that Hodge
dealt with the subset of survivor spouses who had separated from the contributor spouse shortly
before the death of the contributor.
74
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NAPE, the second case in the 2004 cohort, notoriously pivoted on the
budgetary impact argument.79 The equality challenge was to the cancellation by the Newfoundland and Labrador government, on the basis of an
alleged financial crisis, of an agreement to pay three years of pay equity
arrears to female hospital workers. The amount was $24 million.80 The
Court, in unanimous reasons by Binnie J., accepted the government’s
argument that a financial emergency existed of sufficient proportions to
justify, in accordance with section 1, the infringement of equality rights.
Finally, in Auton, the challenge was aimed at the failure of the Medicare
regime in British Columbia to cover the costs of an autism therapy. The
cost to the province was estimated at between $45,000 and $60,000 per
annum per autistic child between the ages of three and six, and was
described as expensive.81 Although the claimants succeeded at trial and
appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada, in a unanimous decision by
McLachlin C.J.C., found that there was no infraction of equality rights.
The last case is Withler in 2011. Here the challenge was to age based
limits on the eligibility of survivor spouses for death benefits under two
federal pension schemes.82 The federal factum asserted that the cost of
rights recognition would be financially prohibitive.83 Press reports put
costs at $2.3 billion if retroactive payments were ordered.84 The Court, in
joint reasons by McLachlin C.J.C. and Abella J., found that equality
rights had not been violated by the under-inclusiveness in the two
regimes. This case bears the highest price tag for rights recognition for
any government — provincial or federal — of all the cases considered.
The financial impact of the eight losing cases is summarized as
follows:

79
For critiques of the budgetary analysis at the heart of the decision in NAPE, supra, note 1,
see Robin L. Reinerston, “Discrimination and Difference: A Comment on Newfoundland (Treasury
Board) v. N.A.P.E. (2004) 3(1) J.L. & Equality 227; Jennifer Koshan, “Newfoundland (Treasury
Board) v. N.A.P.E.” (2006) 18 C.J.W.L. 327 [hereinafter “Koshan”]; and Judy Fudge, “Substantive
Equality, the Supreme Court of Canada, and the Limits to Redistribution” (2007) 23 S.A.J.H.R. 235.
80
NAPE, id., at para. 6, per Binnie J. for the Court.
81
Auton, supra, note 60, at para. 5, per McLachlin C.J.C. for the Court.
82
Canadian Forces Superannuation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-17; Public Service Superannuation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-36.
83
As quoted in Jennifer Koshan & Jonnette Watson Hamilton, “Meaningless Mantra: Substantive Equality after Withler” (2011) 16 Rev. Const. Stud. 31, at 55 [hereinafter “Koshan &
Hamilton”].
84
Amy Minsky, “Widows lose appeal for death benefits; No age discrimination in government policy” Ottawa Citizen (March 5, 2011) A3.
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Table 2
Case
Egan

Eaton

Amount
$12 to $37 million
or 2-4% of program
budget at most
no figure provided

Government
Federal

Regime
pensions (OAS)

Provincial

Law
$80 million
Gosselin $389 million plus 17
years of accrued interest
Hodge
no figure provided,
described as
insignificant
NAPE
$24 million

Federal
Provincial

special
education
pensions (CPP)
social assistance

Federal

pensions (CPP)

Provincial

Auton

Provincial

pay equity
agreement
health care

Federal

pensions

Withler

no figure provided,
described as expensive
$2.3 billion

Again, the charting of wins and losses in this simple manner both
clarifies and obscures. The table shows only correlations, not firm causal
links. This is perhaps more obvious here than in the first table, as the
amounts at stake for government vary wildly. As with the first table, this
second table leaves out all the factors, other than budgetary impact, that
might have influenced the Court’s resolution of each of these cases. Even
NAPE, which of all the 13 cases in my selected cohort is most clearly
about budgetary impact, cannot be explained entirely in those terms.
Nevertheless, the pattern presented is stark enough to support some
important inferences. Because of the variation in amounts at stake, the
second table is best read in combination with the first table. Together
they suggest that a minimal budgetary impact is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for a successful social benefit challenge under section
15, while a serious budgetary impact poses a serious, if not impossible,
hurdle.

(2012), 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) MONEY AND THE LIMITS ON DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

319

III. WHAT HAS THE SUPREME COURT SAID?
FACTORING BUDGETARY IMPACT INTO THE CHARTER
FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court of Canada’s response to the question of what
role budgetary impacts should play in rights adjudication has evolved
over the years from a position of high principle — money and administrative convenience should never trump justice — to a position where
such concerns can be considered at virtually every step of the analysis,
particularly in equality claims. The starting point for any discussion of
the tension between money and justice is Singh v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration),85 one of the first Supreme Court of
Canada Charter cases, in which claimants argued that the procedures
under federal legislation for redetermining the denial of refugee status
violated section 7 of the Charter and section 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of
Rights.86 The Court was unanimous in finding for the claimants but
evenly split between three judges who relied on the Charter and three
who relied on the Bill of Rights.87 In relation to the section 1 Charter
argument, the federal government submitted that to require an oral
hearing before the Immigration Appeal Board “would constitute an
unreasonable burden on the Board’s resources”.88 Justice Wilson, writing
for the three judges who founded their decision on the Charter, referred
to the federal government’s arguments as a “type of utilitarian consideration” and asserted:
No doubt considerable time and money can be saved by adopting
administrative procedures which ignore the principles of fundamental
justice but such an argument, in my view, misses the point of the
exercise under s. 1. The principles of natural justice and procedural
fairness which have long been espoused by our courts, and the
constitutional entrenchment of the principles of fundamental justice in
s. 7, implicitly recognize that a balance of administrative convenience
does not override the need to adhere to these principles.89

The Singh decision required the creation of an adjudicative structure
for determining refugee claims, a result that was extremely expensive for
85

Supra, note 7.
S.C. 1960, c. 44 [hereinafter “Bill of Rights”].
87
Justice Ritchie was one of the seven judges on the panel at the hearing but did not take
part in the decision.
88
Singh, supra, note 7, at para. 68.
89
Id., at para. 70.
86
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the federal government. Singh thus pushed the issue of the cost of rights
recognition into the foreground. Using the equality cases discussed so far
as the unifying theme, I have organized an overview of the evolution of
the Court’s position, in the wake of Singh, on how to resolve the tension
between money and justice into four chronological stages represented by
four emblematic cases: Schachter, Egan, NAPE and Withler. As mentioned in the introduction, much of the discussion in the jurisprudence
focuses on which of the three main steps in the Charter framework — the
rights analysis, the section 1 limitation analysis (and its sub-parts), and/or
the remedy stage — should be the main location for factoring in the
budgetary impact on governments of rights recognition in any particular
case.
1. Schachter and the “Substantial and Compelling Objective”
Analysis
Justice Wilson’s 1985 assurance that constitutional principle should
prevail over administrative convenience became in 1992, in Schachter,
the narrower rule that budgetary considerations cannot serve as a
substantial and compelling objective that justifies limits on rights under
section 1 of the Charter. The Schachter case also clarified that financial
impacts should be an element of the analysis of remedy. In the context of
a discussion of the importance of taking account of legislative objectives
in fashioning remedies, Lamer C.J.C. for the majority stated:
This Court has held, and rightly so, that budgetary considerations
cannot be used to justify a violation under s. 1. However, such
considerations are clearly relevant once a violation which does not
survive s. 1 has been established, s. 52 is determined to have been
engaged and the Court turns its attention to what action should be taken
thereunder. 90

Chief Justice Lamer then went on to set out the framework for crafting
remedial orders under the Charter in a way that included a direct consideration of the budgetary impact on government.91
The Schachter majority’s embrace of budgetary impacts as a key factor at the remedy stage makes sense when placed in the context of the
overall design of Charter argument. On closer reading, Wilson J.’s
“principle trumps utility” sentiment was only ever meant to be a starting
90
91

Schachter, supra, note 15, at 709.
Id.
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point for the eventual elaboration of a more nuanced approach.92 To
confine this elaboration to the remedy analysis in the overall framework
of Charter adjudication would seem to be very faithful to the spirit of
Wilson J.’s assertion. It ensures that full play will be given to questions
of whether rights have been violated and, if so, whether there are nonutilitarian considerations that can justify the violation. Schachter,
however, does not go this far. Rather, consideration of budgetary impacts
is ruled out at the first step of the section 1 inquiry into government
objectives, and then treated as highly relevant at what, in most successful
Charter claims, is the very last “remedy” step. Of course, as discussed
earlier, the remedy question was the only one left open by the time the
case reached the Supreme Court of Canada. The key doctrinal issue left
unanswered by Schachter is whether there are places in the section 1
analysis, other than the substantial and compelling objective inquiry,
where budgetary impacts can play a role.
2. Egan and Judicial Deference in the Proportionality Analysis
That question is quickly taken up in subsequent cases. Three of these
cases (McKinney v. University of Guelph,93 Egan and Irwin Toy Ltd. v.
Québec (Attorney General))94 are cited in support of the proposition,
presented as such in 1997 in Reference re Provincial Court Judges, that
financial concerns can be a legitimate consideration in the minimal
impairment analysis so long as such concerns are not the objective of the
legislation.95 As Lamer C.J.C. stated in the latter case: “While purely
financial considerations are not sufficient to justify the infringement of
Charter rights, they are relevant to determining the standard of deference
for the test of minimal impairment when reviewing legislation which is
enacted for a purpose which is not financial.”96 The moral high ground
thus becomes maintaining the clear bright line, emphasized by Lamer
92

Justice Wilson alludes to this in the final sentence of the above quotation: “Whatever
standard of review eventually emerges under s. 1, it seems to me that the basis of the justification for
the limitation of rights under s. 7 must be more compelling than any advanced in these appeals”:
Singh, supra, note 7, at para. 70. Justice Binnie in NAPE also reads Wilson J.’s statement in less
absolute terms: NAPE, supra, note 1, at para. 67.
93
[1990] S.C.J. No. 122, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “McKinney”].
94
[1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Irwin Toy”].
95
[1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 283 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Provincial
Judges Reference”]. Note that of these four cases, only Egan concerns an equality challenge that
involves the distribution of scarce financial resources. Hence, like Singh, these cases were left out of
my survey in Part I.
96
Id. (emphasis in original).
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C.J.C.’s literal underlining, drawn around the substantial and compelling
objective analysis by the rule in Schachter.
The conundrum of what stance courts should take when recognition
of Charter rights has high financial costs for governments presents itself
in these early years as a subset of the much broader issue concerning
how courts should weigh governmental choices regarding the distribution
of all manner of scarce resources as well as regarding the trade-offs
between competing demands and interests. Of the three cases cited in
support of the Provincial Judges Reference proposition, only Egan is a
case in which there are implications for scarce financial resources. In
McKinney, the different interests of younger and older workers are
balanced in a scheme that is distributing human rights protection. In
Irwin Toy, the interests of children in being protected from manipulation
by advertisers are prioritized over the interests of commerce and of
freedom of expression for both children and commercial interests.
Neither of these cases is about the kind of budgetary line-drawing that is
so clearly front and centre in cases like Egan and Auton. The slippage
between these two sorts of situations — one involving budgetary
concerns and the other policy trade-offs — is important, for it allows the
Court to gloss over their differences. This is particularly true in the
context of Charter challenges to social benefit regimes where these two
dimensions of much governmental decision-making are often intertwined.
However, they are conceptually distinct and, in some contexts, concretely
and actually distinct. Egan, the case I see as emblematic of this second
stage in the evolution of a “dollars versus rights” jurisprudence, is
unusual in that the slippage becomes a point of sharp disagreement
between some of the judges.
Recall that in Egan, Sopinka J.’s reasons, finding that the violation of
equality rights under section 15 could be justified under section 1, made
up the majority in combination with the reasons of four other judges
finding that section 15 had not been violated at all. Despite his solitary
stand in Egan on the section 1 issue, Sopinka J.’s statement in the course
of his reasons that “it is not realistic for the Court to assume that there
are unlimited funds to address the needs of all” came to represent a
quickly solidifying pragmatic stance.97 The doctrinal expression of this
pragmatism is judicial deference to legislative decisions. Justice Sopinka
97
Egan, supra, note 54, at para. 104. See Provincial Judges Reference, supra, note 95, at
para. 283 for examples of the citation of Sopinka J.’s s. 1 analysis for support for a deferential
approach to the proportionality analysis where significant budgetary impacts on the “public purse”
are at stake.
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articulates the trigger for this deferential posture in the broadest terms
possible, namely, in terms of a legislative policy choice: “This Court has
recognized that it is legitimate for the government to make choices
between disadvantaged groups and that it must be provided with some
leeway to do so.”98 Justices Cory and Iacobucci in dissent differ quite
sharply. For them, it is significant that the Egan challenge to the underinclusive OAS provisions does not, as in McKinney, involve balancing an
array of competing interests. As Iacobucci J. put it in their joint reasons,
“[t]he only competing interest in the case at bar is budgetary in nature.”99
Justices Cory and Iacobucci are also much more willing to scrutinize the
claimed budgetary impact. As noted earlier, they find the Crown’s
financial evidence “highly speculative and statistically weak”.100 They
also take the view that “[t]he jurisprudence of this Court reveals, as a
general matter, a reluctance to accord much weight to financial considerations under s. 1 analysis.”101
Although these two points of dispute pale beside the profound disagreements over the nature of equality and the viability of the equality
claim that divided the Bench in Egan, they nonetheless raise significant
issues. The first point of dispute demands that we think about the
implications of the distinction between judicial interference in government budgetary decisions and judicial interference in complex, polycentric policy distinctions. Are different concerns at play in these two
situations, demanding different judicial postures and inquiries? The
second point of dispute pertains to the question of how thorough and
convincing Crown evidence of budgetary strain should be before courts
turn to the question of whether a deferential posture is appropriate. Even
if we agree that courts should behave extremely deferentially where large
financial commitments are at issue, should the precondition be subject to
a much more rigorous scrutiny?
3. NAPE and the Crisis Exception to the Schachter Rule
The third significant marker in the “dollars versus rights” jurisprudence is the NAPE decision itself. The Schachter rule, reinforced in
Provincial Judges Reference, that financial concerns cannot serve to
98
99
100
101

Egan, id., at para. 105.
Id., at para. 214.
Id., at para. 193.
Id., at para. 194.
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meet the “substantial and compelling objective” requirement at section 1,
is reopened and an exception made for situations of extreme financial
crisis.102 This is the ratio that comes out of the NAPE case, along with
the political lesson that women’s equality rights are altogether too easily
trumped.
As doctrine, the NAPE qualification of the Schachter rule is not all
that surprising, and I would speculate that even Wilson J. would concede
that an extreme financial emergency justifies restrictions on rights. NAPE
is more significant in that the Court, invoking legitimacy concerns, was
willing to accept an admittedly flimsy amount of evidence to justify the
government’s assertion of a fiscal crisis. As Binnie J. put it, “[w]hat
transpires in the budgetary process, of course, lies at the high end of
Cabinet confidences... .”103 The contrast with Cory and Iacobucci JJ.’s
demand in Egan for more convincing evidence of budgetary distress is
disheartening.104
The comparison of NAPE with Egan is instructive with respect to
another aspect, that of the murkiness of the distinction between budgetary and social policy decisions. Although Binnie J. could have left us
with simply the “financial emergency” story as an explanation for the
Court’s decision, he strained to characterize governmental purposes in
relation to the cancellation of the pay equity agreements as not simply
cost-cutting in the face of a financial crisis but as a decision to trade off
women’s equality against the priorities of other programs that address
social needs such as health and education.105 Citing the Court’s 1989
decision in R. v. Lee106 for support, Binnie J. asserts: “It was thus clear
from an early date that financial considerations wrapped up with other
public policy considerations could qualify as sufficiently important
objectives under s. 1.”107 This is quite a significant departure from the
Court’s more typical stance, which is to treat the Schachter rule as a
serious constraint.108 It is also a disquieting move. Justice Binnie’s
102

NAPE, supra, note 1, at para. 72.
Id., at para. 58.
See also Jennifer Koshan’s detailed analysis of the fiscal situation in Newfoundland and
Labrador at the time of the litigation and her conclusion that the fiscal situation was, in fact,
“normal”. Koshan, supra, note 79, at para. 112.
105
NAPE, supra, note 1, at para. 75.
106
[1989] S.C.J. No. 125, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1384 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lee”].
107
NAPE, supra, note 1, at para. 69 (emphasis in original).
108
I have come across one other place in which the Schachter rule is ignored, namely, in
Martin, where Gonthier J. cites Eldridge for the proposition that financial concerns can serve as
substantial and compelling objectives. Martin, supra, note 17, at para. 109. However, in Eldridge, La
103
104
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reconstruction of a cost-cutting decision as a policy choice illustrates
how easily the Schachter rule can be circumvented — either for ulterior
purposes or because it actually is impossible to disentangle some
budgetary decisions from policy choices. Subsequent cases illustrate that
this is likely to be a recurring dilemma.
Health Services and Support — Facilities Sector Bargaining Assn. v.
British Columbia,109 a decision handed down three years after NAPE,
provides an example. Here, the wages of hospital workers were once
more sacrificed in the name of cost-cutting, this time by the British
Columbia government. The cost-cutting took the form of legislative
cancellation of collective bargaining rights and agreements. The equality
challenge failed. However, a section 2(d) argument was successful, in
part. At section 1, the Court found that the legislative purpose was to
save costs and thus could not serve as a substantial and compelling
objective.110 It went on, however, to accept the concurrent purpose of
improving health care delivery as substantial and compelling. Although
the Court did not treat the objective as a “mix” of financial and other
types of objectives, as Binnie J. suggests in NAPE, the case nonetheless
illustrates how difficult it can be to give the Schachter rule any real
force. The government’s claim in Health Services failed at a later stage of
the proportionality analysis.111
4. Withler and Frontloading the Proportionality Analysis
The final stage in the shift in judicial attitudes towards limits on
rights made in the name of financial considerations occurs specifically in
the equality context, namely, in the Law to Withler line of cases. Under
the rubric of “correspondence” in Law,112 as so many constitutional
scholars pointed out in the decision’s wake, a version of the section 1
proportionality analysis was frontloaded into the rights analysis stage of
the Charter framework.113 This significantly undermined the effectiveForest J. for the majority only assumed without deciding that the objective of “controlling health
expenditures” is substantial and compelling. See discussion supra, notes 37 to 39.
109
Supra, note 6.
110
Id., at para. 147, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Bastarache J. for the majority.
111
Id., at paras 150-161, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Bastarache J. for the majority.
112
Supra, note 56, at paras. 69-71.
113
For an analysis of the way in which the correspondence analysis in Law duplicates the
s. 1 analysis, see Sheilah Martin, “Balancing Individual Rights to Equality and Social Goals” (2001)
80 Can. Bar Rev. 299; Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, student ed. (Scarborough, ON:
Carswell, 2002), at 1059; June Ross, “A Flawed Synthesis of the Law” (2000) 11(3) Const. F. Const.
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ness of section 15 in achieving equality.114 Withler has revised the
equality framework somewhat but preserved the language of correspondence, now under the rubric of “stereotype”.115 Indeed, Withler has, if
anything, expanded the number of situations in which courts can dismiss
equality claims on the basis of governmental concerns, including financial
concerns, at the rights analysis stage. The upshot is that in many cases,
especially challenges to benefit regimes, courts need no longer grapple
directly with the question of whether the government’s only pressing and
substantial concern in limiting rights is saving money. Rather, such
concerns become, at the initial rights violation stage of analysis, subsumed under the rhetoric of “balancing competing interests” and “distributing scarce resources” as a way to describe the general character of a
legislative regime. Such a character entitles legislatures to a measure of
deference at this early stage in the analysis. The rules in Schachter and
Provincial Judges Reference about budgetary considerations are completely irrelevant as, without the formal structure of section 1 analysis,
there is no attention to whether financial concerns are or are not the
exclusive or dominant legislative objective of the impugned provision, or
whether the legislative measure is proportional. Withler is the key case as
it cements into place this new equality framework and does so in the
context of an under-inclusiveness challenge to social benefit regimes.
As mentioned earlier, Withler concerned a challenge to provisions in
two federal pension schemes that reduced death benefits for survivors, a
group composed disproportionately of elderly women and one that is
already subject to broader economic disadvantage. The reduction
provisions meant that the older the survivor at the time of the death of the
contributor, the less the amount of the benefit. The Court, in reasons by
McLachlin C.J.C. and Abella J., stipulated that the analysis of the
equality right and its infringement, in challenges involving such benefit
programs, must take account of the legislative purposes of both the
impugned provision and the scheme as a whole, concerns about the

74; and Beverly Baines, “Law v. Canada: Formatting Equality” (2000) 11(3) Const. F. Const. 65.
For an argument that Law directs the judicial focus, at the rights analysis stage, to a consideration of
legislative objectives, see Ryder et al., supra, note 6, at 120. The authors also provide empirical
support for the proposition that the correspondence analysis is the most important factor in
determining the outcome of a s. 15 claim. Id., at 121-22.
114
Ryder et al., id.
115
Withler, supra, note 61, at para. 36.
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allocation of scarce resources and policy objectives.116 Jennifer Koshan
and Jonette Hamilton note that the federal factum characterized the
objective of the reduction provisions in purely financial terms, stating
that unreduced benefits would be “financially prohibitive ... either
because of the contribution required from younger employees or the tax
attribution if it’s employer paid”.117 In Withler, the general character of
the legislative scheme — in terms of distributing scarce resources,
addressing competing needs or ameliorating disadvantage — entitles
government to a more deferential standard of review at the rightsinfringement stage, with the result that the equality challenge is dismissed before getting to the fuller review of the governmental position at
section 1.118 As Koshan and Hamilton point out, the more specific costcutting as well as discriminatory objective of the impugned provisions
does not actually feature in the examination of whether equality rights
have been infringed.119
In Withler, not only is section 1 bypassed, but the scope of the equality protection itself is further diminished. Before Withler, the frontloading of the proportionality analysis to create an internal limitation on the
scope of section 15 had significantly hampered the success rate of
section 15 claims.120 Withler’s reaffirmation of the internal limit in
expanded terms will further curtail the effectiveness of section 15,
especially in social benefit cases, thereby further undermining the
Court’s commitment to substantive equality.121
116
Id., at para. 67. Note that the Court specified in Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] S.C.J. No. 29,
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, at para. 109 (S.C.C.) that it is important in an under-inclusiveness challenge to
look at both the general legislative purpose and that of the impugned provision at the “substantial
and compelling objective” stage of s. 1 analysis. Withler brings this focus on both the overarching
legislative purpose and the sub-purpose of the challenged provision into the rights analysis stage.
117
Koshan & Hamilton, supra, note 83, at 55.
118
Withler, supra, note 61, at para. 38. See also the more extensive analysis of this aspect of
Withler in Koshan & Hamilton, supra, note 83, at 58-60.
119
Koshan & Hamilton, id.
120
Sujit Choudry and Claire Hunter, in “Measuring Judicial Activism on the Supreme Court
of Canada: A Comment on Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. NAPE” (2003) 48 McGill L.J. 525,
treat s. 15 rights as ones in which courts have read in an internal limitation to the scope of the rights
(what I have described as frontloading the proportionality analysis), and therefore, those in which
one can expect a lower government “win” rate at s. 1 compared to rights the scope of which are
relatively unlimited. The empirical data in their study support this hypothesis. The government
success rate at s. 1 in s. 15 cases was 20 per cent, compared to 44.4 per cent in s. 2(b) cases. The
latter rights have very few internal limits. Id., at 551. They also found that the lower the government
win rate at s. 1, the higher its win rate overall is likely to be. Thus, s. 15 cases, with a lower win rate
for government at s. 1, have a higher win rate for government than s. 2(b) cases. Id., at 552.
121
Koshan & Hamilton, supra, note 83, at 56 make much the same point, as well as a number of others regarding the failure of Withler to move beyond the doctrinal features of equality
jurisprudence that hamper the development of a substantive approach. Id., at 59-61.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The four junctures sketched out above capture key moments in the
jurisprudence concerning “dollars versus rights”, more specifically
equality rights. It is a bleak story that begins with Wilson J. in Singh
taking the moral high ground and ends with compromise in every
possible direction. The bleakness does not reside in the fact that the
jurisprudence, together with the pattern of wins and losses mapped out in
the first part, indicate that money does indeed limit justice. The tension
between scarcity and justice is an abiding theme in liberal societies. Most
of us accept that “money” and the scarcity of other sorts of resources
limit justice. The bleakness lies in the failure of the jurisprudence to yield
a workable framework for navigating the justice/scarcity tension in a
principled way. The history of equality rights provides a particularly
disheartening overview of this failure.
Robert Charney and Daniel Guttman have argued that if equality
rights are given substantive positive content, then courts should and must
factor in financial constraints.122 I agree with that position stated broadly
in that way. However, I have two concerns. My concern is first and
foremost that Charney and Guttman’s first premise, namely, that we give
substantive content to equality, remains unattainable except in cases
where the financial stakes are very low. Indeed, the Court’s unwillingness to assert principle over utility in the equality realm converges with a
failure, now for almost three decades, to give equality rights substantive
content, and indeed, recently, with the explicit characterization of section
15(1) as a negative protection.123 As the record since the first benefit case
in 1991 indicates, only inexpensive substantive equality claims or ones in
which the budgetary impact is conceded by the Crown to be insignificant
— Tétreault-Gadoury, Schachter, Eldridge, Martin and Hislop — succeed.
It should also be noted that, except for Eldridge, these are all cases that
fit fairly comfortably into a formal equality paradigm. Unless a viable
framework for seriously engaging with governmental concerns about
budgetary impacts can be developed, there would seem to be little hope
for a more meaningful substantive equality jurisprudence.

122
Robert E. Charney & Daniel Guttman, “Is Money No Object?: Can the Government Rely
on Financial Considerations Under the Charter Section 1?” in P. Monahan & J. Cameron, eds.
(2004) 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) 137, at 139 [hereinafter “Charney & Guttman”].
123
Kapp, supra, note 74, at para. 16.
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This brings me to my second concern: what should a viable framework for addressing the costs of rights recognition look like? This is the
“big picture” doctrinal question. I do not think one can complain about
the “follow the money” pattern as well as demand a more robust substantive equality jurisprudence if the only approach to the “dollars versus
rights” controversy on offer is an uncompromising version of Wilson J.’s
stance. On the other hand, the current situation, in which financial
impacts can be invoked at almost every stage of analysis, often foreclosing exploration of key aspects of the claim, is also unacceptable. Financial
impacts do need to be seriously considered at some point. In particular,
we need a “big picture” approach to the issue of where to locate that
consideration, and how to do so in a way that takes account of and respects
the many other fundamental questions raised in a full and meaningful
consideration of rights claims with a distributive justice component.
Some have already taken up this discussion, and their thoughts provide a useful starting point. Charney and Guttman argue that governments should be able to argue that financial constraints are substantial
and compelling objectives.124 Wiseman argues against this and against
the now well-entrenched practice of invoking either injusticiability
doctrine or a deferential standard of review at the proportionality analysis
where scarce financial resources are being distributed or large financial
impacts are at play.125 Instead, he urges that many budgetary concerns
should be addressed at the remedy stage, and the remedial response
should include what he calls competence-building measures.126 His prime
example of the latter is the Provincial Judges Reference, in which the
majority set out the general features of an institutional framework for
ensuring judicial independence while at the same time giving governments leeway to control budgets and determine judges’ salaries in an
arm’s-length manner.127 His second example is Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova
Scotia (Minister of Education),128 a case pursued under section 23 of the
Charter, in which in the same way, the majority approved the approach of
the trial judge, who set out a framework within which the province of
Nova Scotia had to make its “best efforts” to build five schools required
by section 23.129 In other words, the courts in these instances are not
124
125
126
127
128
129

Charney & Guttman, supra, note 122, at 157.
“Competence Concerns”, supra, note 10, at 524-32.
Id., at 540-45.
Id., at 540-42.
[2003] S.C.J. No. 63, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
“Competence Concerns”, supra, note 10, at 532-45.
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ordering legislatures to directly fund a benefit or program, but rather
setting out normative and institutional frameworks within which governments can manage resources and rights in a way that takes seriously
the latter.
The current messy doctrinal situation requires that we pursue these
and other ideas, and that the overarching framework for judicial analysis
of the justice/scarcity tension be given serious consideration by academics, lawyers and judges. It is particularly important to situate the discussion in terms of the larger conceptions of public and private at play at
this political juncture, and to navigate the encounter between welfare
liberalism and neo-liberalism that so often underpins the social benefits
challenges in a more self-reflective and creative way. The Charter cannot
return us to the post-war era, but it should not, as in Gosselin, serve to
erase or exacerbate the injustice of poverty and extreme social insecurity
or, as in Hodge and Withler, to ignore the disproportionate impacts of
such injustices on groups such as elderly women who experience
marginalization in multiple dimensions.
There are other, more pedestrian but strategically crucial questions
arising out of the empirical overview of the cases presented here. Some
of them I have already raised in the course of my discussion. The first
few questions have to do with the evidential precondition for deference
to government decisions. First, it makes sense that where budgetary
impacts are raised as a serious concern, governments should be required
to provide convincing evidence of such impacts before deference is
accorded. Evidence as to the proportion of the budget represented by
the impact should be a more routine element in this evidence, as the
absolute dollar figure by itself reveals little. Also, distinctions between
claims where the number of claimants is numerically fixed (the TétreaultGadoury and NAPE situations), claims where expanded government
liability will be ongoing into the future (the Egan situation) and claims
where both of these are true (the Auton and Law situations), should carry
more weight. Second, once a budgetary impact is convincingly established, courts should also strictly scrutinize any additional claim that
budgetary trade-offs between competing groups are involved. Only when
one or both of these aspects of the governmental claim is established,
should deference be accorded rights violating measures. As well, I would
question whether budgetary trade-offs, without any evidence that serious
budgetary constraints demand such trade-offs, should be entitled to
the kind of “carte blanche” deference represented by Sopinka J.’s stance
in Egan. Rather, it is consistent with the judicial role to require that
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constitutional values feature importantly in legislative decision-making
involving complex policy choices.
The next questions pertain to the lack of nuance in the characterization of legislative regimes when deciding whether courts should defer.
Thus, my third question is whether we need to ask whether equality
claims that are about the distribution of financial benefits, goods in cash,
should be treated differently from claims that are about the distribution of
goods in kind. Many successful equality challenges to financial benefit
regimes — such as pensions or income assistance — can be addressed,
as they were in Schachter, by Parliament or the legislature equalizing
down and thereby recognizing equality rights but mitigating the financial
costs of doing so. With regimes that distribute goods in kind — such as
medical treatments or sign language translation — there is often a clear
price tag on rights recognition, but without the option of equalizing down,
short of drastically reconfiguring or shutting down the entire program
in question. Should legislative regimes that distribute financial benefits
therefore be accorded less deference?
The fourth question is also about nuance. Should cases that are about
social insurance schemes that are largely, if not entirely, self-sustaining
be distinguished from cases that are about programs that governments
fund out of tax revenues? Hislop is perhaps the most helpful case in
this regard. The CPP, the regime under challenge in Hislop, is funded,
not out of general tax revenues, but out of contributions by workers and
their employers.130 Justifying under-inclusiveness towards some of the
contributors to the pension fund on the grounds of burdens on the “public
purse” seems much less acceptable when the “purse” is really funded by
and for contributors, including those being excluded, rather than when
the purse is funded by all of us who meet taxation thresholds, to be
redistributed in a fair and equitable manner for a range of purposes from
environmental assessment processes to fighter jets to social assistance.
Indeed, this distinction may partly explain why the Crown in Hislop
conceded that the financial impact of a liability for $50 million would be
insignificant, and why the majority felt comfortable with an award that
imposed a liability of roughly $30 million.
To conclude, the general point I am making is that Binnie J.’s reference to the “dollars versus rights controversy” covers a range of situa130
Canada, Office of the Chief Actuary, “Optimal Funding of the Canada Pension Plan:
Actuarial Study No. 6”, April 2007, online: <http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/app/DocRepository/1/eng/
oca/studies/Optimal_Funding_CPP_e.pdf>, at 13.
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tions that are significantly different. One way to approach the controversy is to start, as Wiseman has done, with the large theoretical questions about institutional competence and legitimacy. Another approach is
to assume, as I have done, that there are good reasons for the judicial
reluctance to intervene in legislative decisions with direct budgetary
consequences but that nonetheless, this does not excuse a messy, incoherent approach at the level of doctrine and adjudicative process. Perhaps
if we work at the issue from multiple angles, we will end up with more
clarity at multiple levels: political, conceptual, doctrinal and procedural.

